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State Action Immunity and Preemption
in Antitrust Challenges
to State Pricing Laws:
Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board v. Taylor Drug Stores, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Distilled Spirits and Wine Fair Trade Act'
(Act) has prevented price competition among wholesale and re-
tail liquor and wine merchants since 1940.2 The Kentucky De-
partment of Alcoholic Beverage Control has promulgated regula-
tions3 in order to facilitate the administration of the Act and to
promote its overall purpose which is to "stabilize and make an
orderly market for the sale of distilled spirits." 4 In July of 1982
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board v. Taylor Drug Stores, Inc.5 invalidated certain vital pro-
visions6 of the Act as violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7 The
Court relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion of California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. ," which struck down the California Wine Fair
Trade Contracts and Price Posting Act9 on the same grounds. Be-
cause the Kentucky court considered the Kentucky statute to be
essentially indistinguishable from the stricken California statute,
it had no choice but to invalidate the Kentucky Act.
Although both the California and Kentucky Acts were held
to violate facially the Sherman Act, the critical determination in
1KY. REv. STAT. §§ 244.380-.990 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Distilled Spirits and Wine Fair Trade Act, ch. 13, 1940 Ky. Acts 90 (odified at
KRS §§ 244.380-.990 (1981)).
3 804 Ky. ADMIN. REcS. 3:010-060 (1982).'
4 804 Ky. ADMIN. REGs. 3:010 (1982).
5 635 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1982).
6 Specifically KRS §§ 334.380, .390, .470.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1976).
8 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24850-81 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
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both cases was that neither law qualified for "state action" im-
munity from the Sherman Act as articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown. '0 The Court in Parker held
that the Sherman Act prohibited only the anticompetitive activ-
ities of individuals and corporations and did not restrain state ac-
tion that tended to limit or prevent competition. 1 In Midcal, the
Supreme Court announced a two-pronged test to determine
whether state legislation qualifies for Parker state action immu-
nity: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly artic-
ulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the
policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."' 2 The
California and the Kentucky Acts were both found not to require
sufficient active state supervision to meet the second prong of the
Midcal test; thus, neither state was able to use the Parker immu-
nity as a shield against the Sherman Act and the federal policy of
encouraging competition which it embodies.'3
Since the Midcal decision, other state and federal courts have
grappled with the validity of a variety of state regulatory statutes
under the two-pronged test for state action immunity and have
come to surprisingly disparate conclusions. The purpose of this
Comment is to suggest, by using the reasoning expressed by some
of these state and federal courts, that the Kentucky Act is distin-
guishable from the California Act, that although the Kentucky
Act does violate the Sherman Act, it is immune from the Sher-
man Act under the state action exemption, and that the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court should have upheld the Act. This Com-
ment also will discuss the possibility that the United States
Supreme Court may have displaced the Midcal test in a more re-
cent case 14 by requiring analysis of whether the state statute in
question is preempted by the Sherman Act before proceeding to a
state action determination, a shift in emphasis the Kentucky
Supreme Court may have to consider in the near future.
1o 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
1 In Parker the Court said, "we find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or
its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350.
12 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
13 445 U.S. at 106; 635 S.W.2d at 324.
14 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. 3294 (1982).
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I. FROM PARKER TO MIDCAL
In 1943 the United States Supreme Court, in Parker v.
Brown,15 settled the issue of whether anticompetitive legislation
by a state violates the Sherman Act. The Court examined the
legislative history16 and plain language17 of the Sherman Act and
concluded that the Act was not intended to preclude anticompet-
itive activity of the state as sovereign, thereby establishing the
doctrine of state action immunity. This immunity was not un-
limited; in setting its outer boundaries, the Court held that the
state could not "give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful' 81 and that the state could not become a "partic-
15 317 U.S. at 341. Parker involved a challenge to the controls placed on the 1940
California raisin crop by the California Agricultural Prorate Act of 1933. The Act "au-
thorized the establishment... of programs for the marketing of agricultural commod-
ities produced in the state, so as to restrict competition among the growers and maintain
prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers." Id. at 346.
The plaintiffs claimed the program violated three federal provisions: 1) the Sher-
man Act, 2) the Agricultural Marketing Agreement-Ac of 1937 and 3) the commerce
clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. A unanimous Court upheld the program on all
three grounds. The only portion of Parker under consideration here is the unsuccessful
challenge to the program under the Sherman Act. See id. at 350-53.
16 In this context the Court said:
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's
legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as
the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only "business combinations."
21 Cong. Ree. 2562, 2457; see also at 2459, 2461. That its purpose was to
suppress combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize
by individuals and corporations, appears abundantly in its legislative his-
tory.
Id. at 351.
17 In reading the plain language of the Act, the Court concluded:
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no
hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by
a state. The act is applicable to "persons" including corporations, § 7, 15
U.S.C.A., and it authorizes suits under it by persons and corporations. § 15.
Id.
18 Id. The Court cited Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)
for the proposition that:
N'o State can, by merely creating a corporation, or in any mode, pro-
ject its authority into other States, and across the continent, so as to prevent
Congress from exerting the power it possesses under the Constitution over
interstate commerce, or so as to exempt its corporation engaged in interstate
commerce from obedience to any rule lawfully established by Congress for
such commerce.
193 U.S. at 345.
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ipant in a private agreement or combination by others for re-
straint of trade."19
For thirty-two years following Parker, the Supreme Court
left the evolution of state action immunity to lower courts.20 In
1975 the Court began to delineate the scope and application of
Parker immunity with its decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar.21 The Court in Goldfarb placed an express limitation on
state action immunity by holding that it is not enough that the
activities are "'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompet-
itive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting
as sovereign."2' In addition, the Court reaffirmed the validity of
another limitation referred to in the Parker decision by holding
that no state action immunity from the Sherman Act was avail-
able if the state "voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private
anticompetitive activity."2
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,24 a plurality of the Court at-
tempted to make state action immunity unavailable to private
citizens acting under color of state law.25 But since both concur-
'9 317 U.S. at 351-52. To support this limitation the Court cited Union Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) wherein a monopoly created by a combination be-
tween Kansas City, the State of Kansas, and the Union Pacific Railroad to control the op-
eration of a new produce market was held to violate the Sherman Act.
20 During this period, the Supreme Court discussed the state action doctrine only pe-
ripherally in three cases: Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962); Eastern I.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961); and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
For a discussion of these cases in the context of their significance to the evolution of the
Parker doctrine, see Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898, 900 n.8 (1977).
21 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 Id. at 791. Goldfarb involved minimum-fee schedules for lawyer's services
adopted and indirectly enforced by the Virginia State Bar. Even though the Bar was a
state agency by law, the Supreme Court held that its activities in establishing minimum
fees were not protected from the Sherman Act by state action immunity. The importance
of this decision was the recognition that not all anticompetitive activities engaged in by
state agencies are immune from the Sherman Act.
23 Id. at 792. The Court cites Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52 as authority for this state-
ment. See note 19 supra and accompanying text for further discussion.
24 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
25 In Cantor, the Court refused to extend state action immunity to a privately owned
power company that was regulated by the state. Under a state tariff the power company
entered into a program to distribute free light bulbs to its customers. The program was
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ring opinions took exception to this new limitation and stated
that Parker required examination of the activity, not of the status
of the alleged offender, this modification did not ensue.26 Thus,
Cantor simply stands for the proposition that a private power
company subject to state regulation and acting pursuant to a
state tariff does not per se qualify for Parker immunity in all its
activities.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona27 presented to the Supreme
Court a Sherman Act challenge to attorney disciplinary rules
promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court. The rules were held
to meet the Goldfarb limitation 2s on Parker immunity because
"the challenged restraint is the command of the Arizona Supreme
Court" and thus is "compelled by direction of the State acting as
sovereign."30 The state activity in Bates was distinguished from
the activity held not immune in Cantor3 in that 1) the discipli-
nary rules in Bates reflected a clear articulation of state policy,
and 2) the rules were subject to pointed reexamination by the
state policymaker. 32 The announcement of this two-part test was
an important step in the evolution of the Parker state action im-
munity doctrine.
In 1978 the Supreme Court retreated from the generally held
notion that all public officials, agencies and treasuries were safe
from antitrust liability.3 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
challenged by light bulb retailers who claimed it violated the Sherman Act. Significantly,
the four Justice plurality stated that private citizens could not raise Parker immunity as a
defense against a challenge to anticompetitive legislation even if the party claiming the
immunity is subject to state regulation and the challenged activity is embodied in a tariff
approved by a state commission.
2'6 428 U.S. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("the Court has heretofore focussed on
the challenged activity, not upon the identity of the parties to the suit"); id. at 613 n.5
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("to the extent that the plurality, by stressing the identity of
the state defendants in [Parker], intimates that a different result might have been reached
had the raisin growers themselves been sued, I cannot agree").
27 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2 See note 22 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this limitation.
2' 433 U.S. at 359-60.
30 Id. at 360 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 791).
31 See note 25supra and accompanying text.
32 433 U.S. at 362.
33 See generally Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95
HARv. L. REv. 435 (1981).
1982-83]
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& Light Co. ,34 a majority of the Court held that Congress did not
intend to exempt local governments per se from the Sherman
Act.a5 A four justice plurality wrote that "the Parker doctrine
exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or by its subdivisions, pur-
suant to state policy."36 This decision represented another step to-
ward narrowing available applications of state action immunity
and also served to define its scope more clearly. 37
The Supreme Court restated the test for Parker immunity in
New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co. ,3
which involved a challenge to a California law requiring state li-
censing of new locations for retail automobile dealerships, The
Court upheld the law as "a system of regulation, clearly artic-
ulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfet-
tered business freedom," 9 thus emphasizing the first of the two
criteria expressed in Bates. 40
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. ,41 the Supreme Court attempted to synthesize
the holdings of Goldfarb, Cantor, Bates, Lafayette and Fox into
a comprehensive standard for antitrust immunity under Parker.
The Court announced the following two-pronged test to qualify
for state action immunity: "First, the challenged restraint must
be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself."42 It was in light of this test that the Kentucky
Supreme Court considered the validity of the Distilled Spirits and
Wine Fair Trade Act against a Sherman Act challenge.
34 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
"5 Id. at 394-408. The City of Lafayette argued that cities, as agents of the state,
should not be subject to antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine.
36 Id. at 413. Chief Justice Burger in a concurrence wrote that cities engaged in "pro-
prietary" enterprises require state authorization to obtain Parker immunity, perhaps
implying that nonproprietary local government activity would automatically receive state
action immunity. Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37 For further discussion on the impact of Lafayette, see Areeda, supra note 33.
35 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
39 Id. at 109.
40 See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
41 445 U.S. at 97.
42 Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. at 410).
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II. MIDCAL AND TAYLOR DRUG
In striking down the Kentucky Act in Taylor Drug,43 the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that "there is no fundamental
basis upon which we can distinguish this case from Midcal."44
The following discussion suggests Midcal and Taylor Drug are
distinguishable and that the Kentucky Act, unlike the California
Act, qualifies for Parker state action immunity from the Sherman
Act, even though it does violate the Sherman Act.
A. The Kentucky Act Does Violate the Sherman Act
The Kentucky Court's Sherman Act analysis in Taylor Drug
commences: "As in Midcal, we begin with the premise that the
resale price maintenance system existing under the statute here in
question violates the Sherman Act if applicable. '" 45 This state-
ment is a direct reference to the following passage from Midcal:
"the threshold question is whether California's plan for wine
pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled consis-
tently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains trade."46
Continuing its analysis in Midcal, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the California Act constituted resale price
maintenance because "[t]he wine producer holds the power to
prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by
wholesalers.."47 Whereas the United States Supreme Court found
actual resale price maintenance that resulted from California
statutes requiring producers to post state-enforced price sched-
ules to retailers and consumers and file fair trade contracts with
the state, 48 the Kentucky Supreme Court merely assumed that the
Kentucky Act constituted resale price maintenance and thereby
concluded that it violated the Sherman Act. Although the Ken-
tucky Court did not explore the question of whether the Ken-
tucky Act is an illegal resale price maintenance, its "premise"
43 635 S.W.2d at 319.
44 Id. at 324.45 Id. at 323.
46 445 U.S. at 102.
47 Id. at 103.
48 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
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was correct; the following discussion will show that the Act does
indeed violate the Sherman Act.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with an antitrust
challenge to the Connecticut Liquor Control Act 49 in the 1981
case of Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, Department of
Business Regulation, State of Connecticut. 50 The court held these
statutes, which were similar in their effect to the Kentucky Act, 5'
did not violate the Sherman Act and need not be saved by state
action immunity.52 The Kentucky statutes in question incorpo-
rate aspects of both the California statutes struck down in Midcal
and the Connecticut statutes upheld in Morgan. The California
statutes governing wine prices53 expressly gave the wine producer
49 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1 to 30-113 (West 1975), specifically Part V, Prices
§§ 30-63 to 30-68 (repealed 1981).
50 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981).
51 The Connecticut Liquor Control Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-63 to 30-68,
involved a three stage process. In the first stage the manufacturer or out-of-state shipper
filed with the Division of Liquor Control the list of prices at which it would sell its pro-
ducts to Connecticut wholesalers. The second stage required wholesalers to file a list of
prices at which it would sell products to retailers. Section 30-68e required minimum
markups at this stage of 11 % on spirits and cordials, 20% on beer and wine not bottled in
Connecticut and 36% on wine bottled in Connecticut. The third stage involved retail
prices. Retailers were required to mark up spirits a minimum of 21 112%, cordials 28%,
wine 33 1/3%, and beer 20%. After Morgan the Connecticut legislature repealed all the
minimum markup statutes except those governing wholesale prices of wine. In place of
minimum markups the new statutes prohibit wholesalers and retailers from selling pro-
ducts at below statutorily defined cost. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. APPENDIX Unclassified
1981 Public Acts, P.A. 81-294. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the
minimum markup statutes did not violate the Sherman Act. Apparently forces opposing
the minimum markup laws were working for their repeal both judicially and legislatively.
The Kentucky statutes struck down in Taylor Drug, KRS §§ 244.380, 244.390
and 244.470, are different from the Connecticut statutes upheld in Morgan only in that
the Kentucky pricing laws require the wholesaler and retailer to enter into contracts with
their suppliers providing that they will not resell at less than the price stipulated by the
vendor, which price must reflect the markups specified by § 244.390. These markups are
15% for distilled beverages from producer to wholesaler, 20% for wines from producer to
wholesaler, and a 33 1/3% minimum markup for all covered beverages from wholesaler
to retailer. Section 244.400 requires that these contracts be filed with the state.
The effect of the Connecticut and Kentucky statutes is virtually identical in that
retail prices to consumers are basically controlled by state-mandated markups. Whereas
Connecticut simply enforced the markups by prohibiting sales below "cost" (which in-
cluded the markups), the Kentucky statutes go further and require contracts between the
producers, wholesalers and retailers to ensure enforcement of the markups set by the state.
52 664 F.2d at 355.
53 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
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"the power to prevent price competition by dictating prices
charged by wholesalers."' Thus, producers were allowed to set
retail prices in their own economic interest, while "the state's
role is restricted to enforcing the prices specified by the pro-
ducers." In contrast, the Connecticut statutory scheme con-
trolled only the minimum markup between producer, wholesaler
and retailer and did not require producers to set state-enforced
ultimate prices to consumers as in Midcal.56 The Second Circuit
Court distinguished the California statutes which allowed pro-
ducers to set resale prices enforced by the state in violation of the
Sherman Act from the Connecticut statutes which required min-
imum markups from producer to consumer and did not violate
antitrust laws . 7
The Kentucky statutes are similar to the Connecticut statutes
in that the minimum price to consumers is governed by min-
imum markups set by the state. They are similar to the California
statutes in that their mode of enforcement is by contract between
producers, wholesalers and retailers. Although technically the
Kentucky scheme does not allow producers to set ultimate prices
54 445 U.S. at 103. The California statute read:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and rec-
tifier shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers for
which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by the
person who owns or controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or con-
sumers.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
5 445 U.S. at 100-01 (quoting from Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Appeals Bd., 579
P.2d 476 (Cal. 1978), a California Supreme Court decision striking down parallel alco-
holic beverage pricing statutes).
56 664 F.2d at 355.
57 Id. at 355-56 n.2 which states:
It may appear that the Connecticut system permits beer and wine pro-
ducers and shippers to establish resale prices. The automatic application of
the statutory markup to the initial offering price would seem to allow those
who set that price to determine ultimate resale prices by adjusting their of-
fering price. But this result occurs only because the State has dictated the
markups, not because any producers or shippers have formed a conspiracy
or combination. Moreover, the fierce competitive pressures at the retail level
should prevent manufacturers from conspiring to establish prices for alco-
holic beverages.
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to consumers as in Midcal, instead requiring state-enforced min-
imum markups between producer and consumer as in Morgan,
the Kentucky Act violates the Sherman Act because its method of
enforcement is by fair trade contract.5 8 In Midcal, the United
States Supreme Court foreclosed any argument for the validity of
state-mandated resale price maintenance by holding that since
Congress "repealed the Miller-Tydings Act . . .the Sherman
Act's ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair trade
contracts unless an industry or program enjoys a special antitrust
immunity."'5 9 The statute in Morgan was facially valid because
"[u]nlike the California statute in Midcal, the Connecticut stat-
utes do not authorize or compel private parties to enter contracts
or combinations to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act."6 The Kentucky Act cannot claim such lack of compulsion
since it requires private parties to enter into fair trade contracts.
The Kentucky Supreme Court could have saved the Act by strik-
ing down only the sections calling for the filing of fair trade con-
tracts6' and leaving intact the sections governing minimum mark-
ups612 under the theory expressed in Morgan. 3 Instead, the Court
chose to view the statutes as a single entity necessitating a finding
that the composite Act violated the Sherman Act.
B. The Kentucky Act Qualifies for Parker State Action Immu-
nity
Statutes found to violate the Sherman Act still may be upheld
on the alternative ground of Parker immunity. Midcal set up two
58 KRS § 244.380(1). "No distiller ... wholesaler... or retailer shall sell any dis-
tilled spirits or wine... except pursuant to a fair trade contract . I..." d.
59 445 U.S. at 102-03.
6o 664 F.2d at 355.
61 The fair trade contracts are called for by KRS § 244.380; the requirements of fil-
ing and the necessary contents are set out in KRS § 244.400; and their enforcement is pro-
vided for in KRS § 244.470.
62 KRS § 244.390. A major difficulty with letting this section stand is that the en-
forcement of the minimum markup is made dependent upon the fair trade contracts
through its preface: "The contract referred to in KRS § 224.380 shall provide for the fol-
lowing minimum resale prices without discount." Id. If the Court had not invalidated the
statute, the legislature would have had to rewrite it in order to provide for a different
mode of enforcement.
63 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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criteria that must be met before state legislation can be protected
from the Sherman Act by state action immunity. The first re-
quirement is that the challenged restraint must be "clearly artic-
ulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."64 Apparently
the Kentucky Supreme Court presumed the Kentucky Act met
this part of the test by virtue of its being state legislation.s The
second part of the test requires the state to supervise actively the
enforcement of this policy. 6 In finding that the Act does not meet
this part of the test and therefore is not within the state action
immunity, the Court did not use the term "active supervision."
Instead it quoted language from Midcal giving examples of what
"active supervision" might entail, i.e., establishing and review-
ing prices, regulating the terms of fair trade contracts, monitor-
ing market conditions or engaging in a pointed reexamination of
the program.67 Based on this language, the Court concluded
"that the critical test of 'state action' must be whether the state
exercises some reasonable degree of control over the prices."6
64 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. at 410 (1978).
r5 635 S.W.2d at 323-24. The court merely mentions the first part of the test, id. at
324 n.8, as both parties conceded that this first prong was met. In contrast, the Supreme
Court in Midcal looked at the California statute and concluded that "[lthe California sys-
tem for wine pricing satisfies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly stated
and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance." 445 U.S. at 105.
66 445 U.S. at 105.
67 635 S.W.2d at 323 (quoting language from California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 106). The exact language used in Midcal to de-
scribe a lack of active supervision was:
The program, however, does not meet the second requirement for Parker
immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor re-
views the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the
terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions
or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program. The national pol-
icy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak
of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrange-
ment.
445 U.S. at 105-06 (emphasis added). Through the Act's system of minimum mark-ups,
Kentucky has effectively "established prices."
6' 635 S.W.2d at 324. The Court goes on to state:
Somewhere along the line an agency of the state must possess and must exer-
cise the right to pass judgment, either by itself establishing the price, or by
reviewing and accepting, rejecting or modifying a price set by someone else.
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As the following examples indicate, other jurisdictions have
given varying readings to Midcal's active supervision require-
ment. Prior to Midcal, the California Supreme Court had invali-
dated parallel liquor pricing statutes 9 in Rice v. Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Appeals Board.70 After a detailed review of the
Parker immunity line of cases,7' the court concluded that the stat-
ute in question did not qualify for state action immunity because
"the state play[ed] no role whatever in setting retail prices.."72
This language is cited in Midcal73 and it is evident that the Rice
analysis of state action immunity had great influence over the
Supreme Court's enunciation of the second prong of the Midcal
test. 74 Thus, in Rice and Midcal, the state's involvement was held
inadequate to meet the active supervision test because the state
Without this ultimate power no amount of monitoring, supervision, re-
examination, or proscribing of contract terms can have any meaningful ef-
fect.
Id.
Midcal, however, did not require that a state agency have the "ultimate power" to
establish prices or to review and accept, reject, or modify prices set by others. Midcars
examples of possible "active supervision" in fact included activities, such as monitoring
market conditions and doing a "pointed reexamination," which would not amount to the
"reasonable degree of control over prices" required by the Kentucky court. See note 67
supra for the Midcal Court's description of examples of active state supervision. Also, see
the text accompanying notes 77-97 infra for a discussion of cases which have found that the
active supervision requirement for state action immunity is met by state involvement
which arguably did not arise to the "ultimate power" of control over prices which the
Kentucky Court suggested is required by Midcal.
69 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 9 24755 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
70 579 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1978).
71 Id. at 483-85.
72 Id. at 486 (emphasis added). The court's reasoning was:
In the price maintenance program before us, the state plays no role
whatever in setting the retail prices. The prices are established by the pro-
ducers according to their own economic interests, without regard to any
actual or potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is restricted to en-
forcing the prices specified by the producers. There is no control, or
"pointed re-examination," by the state to insure that the policies of the Sher-
man Act are not "unnecessarily subordinated" to state policy. Thus, in our
view, we would be extending the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court beyond their intended design if we were to hold, as the department
urges, that this scheme is immune from the Sherman Act.
Id,
7' 445 U.S. at 100-01.
74 Compare id. with id. at 105-06 (the Court in Midcal simply restates and expands
upon the standard expressed in Rice).
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exerted no control over retail prices. The Kentucky Act tightly
controls prices at three levels of commerce 75 and cannot be said to
fall into the category of statutes where the "State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties." 76
In a decision of particular interest since it also involved a
challenge to an alcoholic beverage pricing law, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court, in M. H. Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Commission,7 held that a Massachusetts law 7s
passed the Midcal two-part test. The Massachusetts scheme
exerted substantially less state supervision than the Kentucky Act
in that, in Massachusetts, "the commission ordinarily has no
direct control over alcoholic beverage prices"; 79 yet it was upheld
since "the commission . . . is the final arbiter of the price at
which alcoholic beverages are sold by suppliers to Massachusetts
wholesalers"80 and thus there is active state supervision. 81
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently upheld a state law
regulating automobile dealerships 82 on the ground of state action
immunity in Benson and Gold Chevrolet v. Louisiana Motor
Vehicle Commission.83 The court concluded that, even though
the program lacked many aspects of state supervision,84 since
7" See KRS § 244.390.
76 445 U.S. at 105.
77 434 N.E.2d 986 (Mass. 1982).
78 MAss. GEN. LAws Ch. 138 §§ 25B, 25D (Law Co-op. 1981).
7' 434 N.E.2d at 991.
S0 Id. The court vent on to hold:
Unlike the state activity in Midcal, §§ 25B and 25D are not simply an au-
thorization for private parties to engage in price fixing. The Commonwealth
actively supervises the statute. The Commission ultimately controls pricing
and the legislature has established a method by which the affirmed price
will be reasonable.
Id. (citation omitted).
1 For another example of a case in which mere authorization by a state statute and
regulation by state commission combined to satisfy the active supervision test, see Bally
Mfg. Corp. v. New Jersey Casino Control Comm'n, 426 A.2d 1000 (N.J. 1981).
8 2 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1256 (West 1963).
83 403 So.2d 13 (La. 1981).
84 The court detailed the following deficiencies in the statute regarding active state
supervision:
[T]he Motor Vehicle Commission has never independently determined the
market area for any dealership; . . .it has never conducted studies of mar-
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supervision was by the state and not by private partiess and the
state agency involved was exercising its statutory duties, there
was sufficient active supervision to allow application of state ac-
tion immunity.86
In George W. Cochran Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury,
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, 7 the Maryland Supreme
Court upheld the Maryland Unfair Cigarette Sales Act.a In de-
termining whether active supervision existed, the court looked at
the nature of state involvement to ensure that state action "is not
simply an authorization for private parties to engage in price-fix-
ing arrangements and is not merely an enforcement mechanism
for prices agreed upon'by private parties." 9 After analyzing the
statute, the court concluded that "the State Comptroller admin-
isters the statute, is charged with the duty of enforcing it, em-
ploys inspectors to that end, and may seek a variety of remedies
to enforce the act. Thus, the legislative policy is 'actively super-
vised' by the state itself."9"
While state courts thus have uniformly upheld statutes chal-
lenged on antitrust grounds9' and have consistently upheld chal-
lenges to liquor control laws on various other grounds, 92 federal
ket conditions to discover instances of price fixing; .. it has never made
any follow-up determination to ascertain that a dealership's floor area or
service facilities remain adequate; and . . [it] has never suspended or re-
voked a dealership's license because of failure to maintain qualifications for
a license.
Id. at 24.
85 The court stated in this context:
Immunity from antitrust legislation is conditioned upon a state policy being
actively supervised by the state itself, rather than by private parties. The de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court make it clear that the evil to be
eliminated is that which occurs when essentially private interests claim im-
munity from antitrust legislation by inducing some involvement by the state
in regulation which is basically protective of private interests.
Id. 56 Id. at 25.
87 437 A.2d 194 (Md. 1981).
88 MD. Coi. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-501 to 11-510 (Michie 1975).
89 437 A.2d at 198.
90 Id.
91 See notes 77-90supra and accompanying text.
92 See Jules Inc. v. Boggs, 270 S.E.2d 679, 681 n.3 (W. Va. 1980) ("The Twenty-
First Amendment . . . has been found to give a state broad powers beyond the normal
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courts have been less consistent in the wake of Midcal in holding
state statutes valid when claimed to be anticompetitive. In Mor-
gan v. Division of Liquor Control, discussed earlier, 93 the Second
Circuit found that the Connecticut alcoholic beverage control
statutes94 qualified for state action immunity as an alternative
ground for upholding the statutes. 95 The court found active
supervision in the fact that the pricing system's merits had fre-
quently been debated in the legislature and in the "structuring
[of] a detailed mechanism for determining prices for alcoholic
beverages." 9 A number of other federal circuit courts also have
found sufficient active state supervision to uphold state statutes
challenged on Sherman Act grounds9 7
In contrast, some federal circuit courts have struck down
state statutes for failure to meet Midcal's two-pronged test for
police powers to regulate intoxicating liquor." Interestingly, the court cites Midcal, among
other cases as authority for this proposition); Colby Distributing Co. v. Lennen, 606 P.2d
102, 111 (Kan. 1980) ("We hold pursuant to the power and authority granted the state by
the Twenty-first Amendment and pursuant to. . . the Kansas Constitution, to promote
temperance and for the protection of the general welfare, health and safety of the people
of Kansas, the legislature properly acted to permit a system of exclusive brand franchis-
ing .... ), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 943 (1980). See also notes 77-81 supra and accom-
panying text. For a case invalidating a liquor control law on first amendment grounds see
Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 429 N.Y.S.2d 616, 620 (N.Y. 1980) ("The
State's power to control and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages is designed to protect
the public from abuses related to alcohol consumption. It is not a license to censor what-
ever occurs at premises authorized to sell alcohol" and therefore the state Liquor Authority
could not ban topless dancing at licensed premises), rev'd per curiam, 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
9' 664 F.2d 353. See notes 49-63 supra and accompanying text discussing Morgan in
the context of the question of whether the Kentucky Act violates the Sherman Act.
94 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-63 to 30-68 (West 1975) (repealed 1981).
95 664 F.2d at 356. The court initially found the statutes did not violate the Sherman
Act. See notes 50-57 supra and accompanying text. In the opinion, the court does not make
clear that Parker immunity is an alternative ground for upholding the statutes. But the
lower court opinion, Serlin Wine & Spirit Merchant v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936 (D. Conn.
1981), relied upon in Morgan and cited with full approval, unequivocally finds the Con-
necticut statutes qualify for state action immunity as an alternative ground for holding
them valid. Id. at 939-40.
96 664 F.2d at 356.
97 See Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 198.) (The
court, in dicta, after finding the statute did not violate the Sherman Act, stated that Ohio's
prohibition of film studio blind bidding arrangements satisfied active supervision require-
ment); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (state set jockey
fees actively supervised); Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.
1982) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2301 (1982) (Arizona race track allocation law mandated ac-
tive supervision by the state).
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state action immunity. In Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Com-
mission,"' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Ore-
gon's alcoholic beverage pricing regulations99 on the theory that
"Oregon mandates posting of prices to be charged by each
wholesaler, but does not in any way review the reasonableness of
the price set." 100 Since the regulations merely effectuated price
posting and prohibited quantity discounts, the court concluded
that the program was not actively supervised under Midcal and
therefore did not qualify for state action immunity from the
Sherman Act.
In Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Commission,10' the
Ninth Circuit sustained an injunction preventing enforcement of
the Nevada regulatory scheme for milk pricing. 0 2 The court
found that there was a high probability that the suit challenging
the regulations would succeed on the merits in district court and
that "the consuming public in Nevada would suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction were not granted."103 Although the hold-
ing in this case did not require the lower court to invalidate the
statute, the appellate court did make a point of expressly com-
menting on the "absence of active supervision by the state" since
the state "does not set wholesale prices and simply enforces pri-
vately-set prices through the mechanism of advance filing."'1 4
This enforcement of producer-posted prices is analogous to the
procedures for alcoholic beverages and wine in Miller and Mid-
cal. The common thread in these cases0 5 is that state enforcement
98 688 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1982).
99 OR. ADMIN. R. 845-10-210 (1980).
'00 688 F.2d at 1226-27.
101 676 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1982).
102 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 584.583(5)-.584 (1979).
103 676 F.2d at 378.
104 Id. at 379.
105 For another instance where a federal circuit court invalidated a state statute
under Midcal, see Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (regulations governing a
local steamship authority failed to meet both Midcal tests).
For recent state action cases not decided on active supervision grounds see Gren-
del's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1981), afJ'd sub nom. Larkin v. Gren-
del's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982) (statute giving churches and schools veto power over
the issuing of alcoholic beverage licenses found not to be compelled by state interests under
the facts in the case); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychology v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d
476, 482 n.10 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (Blue Cross not allowed to
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of manufacturer-posted prices is not sufficient active state super-
vision to overcome the anticompetitive effect of these statutes
and be shielded by Parker immunity. This thread does not run to
the Kentucky Act which, instead of protecting producer-posted
prices, enforces state-mandated minimum markups by whole-
salers and retailers.
In summary, courts have found active state supervision if:
the state, not private parties, provided the supervision;0o the
state administered and enforced the statute;10 7 the state was the
final arbiter of prices at which alcoholic beverages were sold; 08
or the state legislature had merely debated the merits of the reg-
ulation and established a detailed enforcement mechanism. 109 In
contrast, courts have found active supervision lacking when the
state did no more than require manufacturers to post prices and
then enforce those prices. "0
In Taylor Drug, the Kentucky Supreme Court implied that
the Kentucky Act had merely placed "a gauzy cloak of state in-
volvement over what is essentially a private price fixing arrange-
ment""' and stated that to satisfy the second prong of the Midcal
test the "state must exercise some reasonable degree of control
over the prices."1' 2 The Kentucky Court's interpretation of what
constitutes active supervision therefore is more stringent than
that of any other state or federal court. Under any of the stan-
dards reviewed previously, the Kentucky Act seemingly consti-
tuted sufficient active state supervision to qualify for Parker im-
munity. Even under the Kentucky Court's own, more stringent,
raise state action immunity: "In this case the state does not even permit the challenged pol-
icy; a.fortiori it is not state action"); Sound, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1335 (8th Cir. 1980) (statutes regulating Iowa public utilities did not
intend to give a monopoly to the phone company so the court was "unable to find in the
state statutes any clearly articulated or clearly expressed policy of replacing competition
with regulation in the telephone terminal equipment market").
'M See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
107 See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
108 See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
109 See notes 93-96supra and accompanying text.
110 See notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text.
1 635 S.W.2d at 323-24 (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 106).
112 635 S.W.2d at 324.
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standard, the Act, in establishing and enforcing minimum mark-
ups from producer to consumer, does provide state control over
prices at three levels of commerce 13 and thus should satisfy the
active supervision requirement.
III. LOOKING AHEAD: STATE ACTION IMMUNITY PREEMPTED
As the state action doctrine has evolved in the Supreme
Court, a minority undercurrent has argued that the primary
issue should not be whether states are immune from the Sherman
Act but rather whether state legislation is preempted by the su-
premacy clause."' This movement originated in the dissenting
opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co.," 5 wherein Justice Stewart wrote that the
issue in Parker "was whether the California statute was pre-
empted by the Sherman Act, not whether sovereign States were
immune from suit under the Sherman Act." 116 This interpretation
remained quiescent following Cantor and did not surface again
until the recent case of Community Communications Company,
Inc. v. City of Boulder, Colorado,"7 wherein Justice Rehnquist,
writing for himself, Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor,
dissented: "The question addressed in Parker and in this case is
not whether State and local governments are exempt from the
Sherman Act, but whether statutes, ordinances and regulations
enacted as an act of government are preempted by the Sherman
Act under the operation of the Supremacy Clause.""' 8 The pre-
emption question came to the forefront recently in Rice v. Nor-
113 See note 51 supra for a discussion of this portion of the Kentucky Act.
114 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Id.
15 428 U.S. 579.
116 Id. at 618 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
117 455 U.S. 40 (1982). In this suit a cable television company attempted to prevent
the City of Boulder from enforcing a moratorium against cable service installation. The
moratorium was challenged on Sherman Act grounds and Boulder raised state action im-
munty in defense. The majority held that the first prong of the Midcal test, the "clear ar-
ticulation and affirmative expression" of state policy requirement, was not met so that
Boulder could not avail itself of state action immunity.
118 Id. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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man Williams Co. ,n9 in which the majority of the Court, led by
Justice Rehnquist, held that a California Alcoholic Beverage stat-
ute' 20 was not preempted212 by the Sherman Act and that there-
fore state action analysis was not required to determine the valid-
ity of the statute. 1 The Court reconciled Midcal with this shift
in emphasis by observing that the California statute in question
in Midcal "mandated resale price maintenance, an activity that
has long been regarded as a per se violation of the Sherman
Act."' 23 This observation implies that the-statute found to be
lacking active state supervision in Midcal and incapable of being
shielded by Parker immunity also would have been preempted
by the Sherman Act, thus leading to the same result.
The holding in Norman Williams indicates that a different
approach must be taken in the future when analyzing state anti-
competitive legislation. Norman Williams implies that a state
statute can have an anticompetitive effect and still be upheld; it
will not be preempted by the Sherman Act unless "there exists an
irreconcilable conflict between federal and state regulatory
schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is
insufficient to warrant the preemption of the state statute."'24
1'9 102S. Ct. 3294.
120 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23661 (West Supp. 1981). The statute prohibited im-
porters of alcoholic beverages from buying from anyone except state authorized dealers.
121 The Court explained its analysis as follows:
In determining whether the Sherman Act preempts a state statute, we
apply principles similar to those which we employ in considering whether
any state statute is preempted by a federal statute pursuant to the Suprem-
acy Clause. As in the typical preemption case, the inquiry is whether there
exists an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory
schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient
to warrant the preemption of the state statute.
102 S. Ct. at 3299.
122 Id. at 3301 n.9.
123 Id. at 3299 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. at 102-03).
124 Id. In this context the Court further stated:
A state regulatory scheme is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws
simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with
the statute might cause him to violate antitrust laws. A state statute is not
preempted simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive
effect. [citations omitted].
A party may successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only
if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy.
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Thus the Court set up a standard for preemption by the Sherman
Act that will be difficult for parties challenging state legislation
to meet. In attempting to define the threshold of preemption bet-
ter, the Court concluded that a state statute "may be condemned
under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct
that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all
cases, or if it places irresistable pressure on a private party to vio-
late the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute."'1 As
an example of the type of statute that would be preempted, the
Court pointed out that the statute challenged in Midcal, where-
by the state enforced retail prices set by producers, had a "perni-
cious effect on competition and lack[ed] . . . any redeeming vir-
tue," 12 6 thus requiring preemption by the Sherman Act.
The introduction of preemption analysis by the majority in
Norman Williams puts the status of Parker in doubt. The Court
in Norman Williams held that, since the statute being challenged
was not preempted, it was unnecessary to proceed to a state
action analysis. 2 Though unclear, this concept possibly includes
two implications important to analysis of state anticompetitive
legislation: 1) statutes that are anticompetitive in nature, though
not so "pernicious" or "irreconcilable" with federal antitrust pol-
icy as to be preempted, no longer need to pass the Midcal tests for
state action immunity to be held valid; and 2) a statute that was
held preempted could be shielded from the Sherman Act by
Parker immunity. Although Justice Rehnquist does imply, per-
haps inadvertently, that Parker immunity could be resorted to in
order to save a preempted statute, 12 the Parker decision itself
might preclude such a possibility. The Court in Parker held that
state action immunity is not available where a state "give[s] im-
munity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it, or . . . declare[s] that their action is law-
'25 Id. at 3300.
126 Id. at 3299 n.5 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 50 (1977)).
12 7 Id. at 3301 n.9. The Court observed: "Because of our resolution of the preemp-
tion issue, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from in-
validation under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) or under the
Twenty-First Amendment." Id.
128 See note 127 supra.
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ful ...[or] become[s] a participant in a private agreement or
combination by others for restraint of trade."'1 Thus, the outer
limit of Parker immunity may coincide with the point where a
statute is so irreconcilable with the Sherman Act as to require
preemption under Norman Williams. Similarly, a statute which
would qualify for the Parker immunity would seem to be valid
under Norman Williams as an anticompetitive statute not requir-
ing preemption. Thus, state action immunity has apparently be-
come a shield with nothing to protect.
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Act challenged in Taylor Drug should not
have been invalidated by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Act
did violate the Sherman Act, but it should have been protected
from the Sherman Act by Parker state action immunity. By hold-
ing that anticompetitive legislation must exert "some reasonable
degree of control over the prices"1 30 and thereby refusing to ex-
tend state action immunity to the Act, the Court applied a
stricter standard than is required by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Midcal, as interpreted by other courts. 131 In ad-
dition, a careful analysis of the Kentucky Act discloses that it
does exert such reasonable control as to meet this test. 
32
The Kentucky Retail Liquor Dealers Association has decided
not to appeal the Taylor Drug decision to the United States
Supreme Court.'3 If Taylor Drug had been appealed, it prob-
ably would not have been finally decided on state action
grounds. Unless Norman Williams proves to be an aberration,
the Court would have determined whether the Kentucky Act
was preempted by the Sherman Act, not whether it was immune
from its dictates. If preemption analysis had been applied to the
12 317 U.S. at 351-52.
130 635 S.W.2d at 324.
131 See notes 69-105supra and accompanying text for a discussion of these court deci-
sions.
132 See note 51 supra for an analysis of the provisions in question. Also see note 68
supra for further discussions by the Court as to what this standard requires. The provisions
of the Kentucky Act could easily be construed to fall within this standard.
133 The Saturday Lexington Herald and Leader, Oct. 2, 1982, at B3, col. 5.
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Act, it would have been upheld under the new standards laid
down in Norman Williams, negating any need for further inves-
tigation into the correctness of denying Parker immunity to the
Act.
The Kentucky Supreme Court may have an opportunity to
evaluate this post-Midcal shift to preemption analysis. In the
wake of Taylor Drug, the Kroger Company is seeking invalida-
tion of the Kentucky Milk Marketing Law'3 (Milk Law) as viola-
tive of antitrust laws in Kroger Co. v. Kentucky Milk Marketing
and Antimonopoly Commission.'- If a preemption analysis is
used, the Kentucky courts should find the Milk Law to be pre-
empted by the Sherman Act if it "irreconcilably conflicts with
federal antitrust policy,"'136 has a "pernicious effect on competi-
tion and lack[s] ... any redeeming virtue."' 37 It is unclear
whether the Milk Law, if preempted, still could be saved by state
action immunity if found to meet the two-pronged test of Mid-
cal. l-
Like the alcoholic beverage act,139 the Milk Law probably
does violate the Sherman Act since it calls for the establishment
of prices by producers and provides for enforcement of these
prices by prohibiting vendors from selling milk products below
cost. 140 In Norman Williams the Supreme Court stated that resale
price maintenance of the type under attack in Midcal was a per
se violation of the Sherman Act,' 4' and required the statute to be
preempted. The Milk Law mandates that the state engage in
exactly this sort of resale price maintenance and should probably
be preempted. Still, Norman Williams does leave unanswered
the question whether state action immunity can save a statute
from invalidation even though it would otherwise be preempted.
If the answer to this question is affirmative, active state super-
'4 KRS §§ 260.675-.760 (1981).
135 Kroger Co. v. Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-monopoly Comm'n, No. 82-
CI-1175 (Franklin Cir. Ct.). Briefs were to be submitted by the parties on March 11,
1983. A restraining order was dissolved on January 19, 1983.
136 102 S. Ct. at 3299.
137 Id. at 3299 n.5.
138 See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
139 See notes 45-58 supra and accompanying text.
140 See KRS §§ 260.705-.710 (1981).
141 See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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vision would once again be the crucial factor in determining the
validity of the statute. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held
that the key to active supervision is whether the statute "exer-
cise[s] some reasonable degree of control over the prices."'' 2
Under this standard the Milk Law would fail since the prices are
essentially controlled by the producer and enforced by the state
so that the state has insufficient control to qualify for active
supervision. Unless the Kentucky Supreme Court decides to
modify its holding in Taylor Drug and broaden its definition of
active state supervision to place it in line with decisions by other
state courts and federal courts, the Milk Law would have to be
invalidated. Whether such a strict construction of Midcal's active
state supervision requirement is correct may ultimately have to
be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
Randy Donald Shaw
142 635 S.W.2d at 324.
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